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On January 1, 1958, the "Cartel Statute" of the Federal Republic
of Germany' became effective. American interests in this event are
threefold:
(1) During the past decade Americans have tried to convince the
Western world that in an industrial, democratic society legislation of
the American antitrust type is imperative. Is the German cartel statute
a piece of legislation of this type?
(2) The enactment of the statute brings to an end the application
of Law No. 56 enacted by the American Military Government on
January 28, 1947. The Paris Treaty between the Allied Powers and
Germany provided that the Allied "cartel laws," though administered
by the German Minister of Economics, should remain in effect until
the German legislature could agree on a new statute.
(3) The statute will vitally affect trade between America and Ger-
many as well as the operation of sizable American controlled enter-
prises there.
The new German statute deals with the factual situations covered
by section 1 of the Sherman Act,2 sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act,3
the Webb-Pomerene Act,4 the Miller-Tydings Act,5 as well as parts
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center; Director of the Institute for
International and Foreign Trade Law, Frankfurt, Germany and Washington,
D.C.
1. The statute, enacted on July 27, 1957 (published in the Federal Statute
Book BGB1. I p. 1081) becomes effective on Jan. 1, 1958, on the basis of
§ 109 (1) of the statute. Up to now, two commentaries are available, by Eugen
Langen and Harold Rasch. The American observer should also consfilt the
excellent article by Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany-
A Comparative Study, 105 U. PA. L. Rnv. 617 (1957).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
3. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1952).
4. 40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1952).
5. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.6 It is not an act
authorizing dissolution of monopolies (section 2 of the Sherman Act) ;7
it desires to be no Robinson-Patman Act (section 2 of the Clayton
Act) .8 The German statute, in what it provides and in what it omits,
has to be understood as a part of the system of German law, private
and public.
The private law in Germany has formulated certain basic rules
governing the behavior of monopolies and the methods of competi-
tion.9 The courts have held, for example, (a) that the monopolist is
obliged to supply customers depending on him with necessary goods
and services; 10 (b) that a trade association or monopoly may not, under
the terms of sale, immunize itself from sellers' liabilities; (c) that
exclusive dealing clauses may not be used in an excessive way."
Other court decisions, however, have supported cartel trends.12 The
coordination of these cases and the principles behind the new statute
will raise difficulties.
The cartel statute deals-as American antitrust law does--with
agreements between or behavior of private enterprises. The basic
law does not give the competitive economy or any other economic
form the express character of a constitutionally guaranteed order.
Huber 3 and Geiger 4 have in fact concluded that the constitutional
guarantee of the freedom to enter contracts outlaws any rule which
prohibits cartel contracts. The constitutionality of the new statute,
however, has not been doubted. The prevailing opinion appears to
accept Biedenkopf's suggestion 15 that the cartel statute has been en-
acted as a legislative interpretation of the constitutional guarantee
of contractual freedom which demands an "order of free determination
6. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as'amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
7. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
8. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
9. Section 826:(138 BGB (Civil Code of 1896)) 'Whoever, by methods
inconsistent with good morals, intentionally afflicts another person with dam-
age, is obliged to make restitution for such damages." Section 138 I: "Any
legal act violating principles of good morals, is void."
10. RGZ (Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen) 132, p. 216; 133, 391. Nipperdey,
Kontrahierungszwang und diktierter Vertrag (1920).
11. As to exclusive dealing contracts between breweries and innkeepers
see RG 152, 215; as to uniform agreed condition of sale, etc., see Palandt, BGB
(16. ed. 1951) § 138 (5) (a). BOEHm, WETTBEWERB UrD MONOPOLKAMPF raised
first the import of the meaning of "fair" and "unfair" competition on cartel
law. The general clause of § 1 UWG requires clarification of the relation
between "fair" competition and economic order.
12. See especially the interpretation of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren
Wettbewerb (UWG) of June 7, 1909 (BGBL. p. 499).
13. HUBER, DIE VERFASSUNGSPROBLEMvIATIK EINES KARTELLVERBOTS, GUTACHTEN
SlO (1955).
14. GEIGER, GRUNDGESETZLICHE SCERANKEN FUR EINE KARTELLGESETZGEBUNG S 6
(1955).
15. BIEDENKOPF, F=RHITLIcHE ORDNUNG DURCH KARTELLVERBOT, AxTUELLE
GRUNDSATZFRAGEN DES KARTELLRECHTS (1957).
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of the individual, protected against unlicensed interference from
private powers."
It is important to realize that the enactment of this statute, while
a compromise in every respect, is the expression of an ideological
movement aiming at a free competitive order. The post-World War II
success of Germany's reconstruction is indeed the result of a liberation
from the chains of a planned economy, accomplished under the leader-
ship of Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics, and the teaching of
the "Freiburg School" (Eucken and Boehm). The American policy
in Europe has partly strengthened this ideology while, on the other
hand, a rather unfortunate method of deconcentration in the banking,
coal and steel fields has had a weakening influence. Germany's eco-
nomic interests today call for relatively open import markets. While
the liberalization of import tariffs and restrictive import provisions is
at present a matter of dispute between the German government and
the members of GATT, one cannot doubt the prevailing German inter-
est in open trade. The boom and the immediate post-war technological
upswing has permitted some opening of oligopolistic markets: Grundig
with 20,000 employees has successfully penetrated the highly cartelized
radio and television field; Hans Glas (GmbH Dingolfing) has entered
the field of big manufacturers of small cars (Goggomobil) and Quelle
(GmbH) has become a counterpart of Sears & Roebuck. In the field of
craftsmanship perhaps no other decision of the American High Com-
mission in Germany has been considered as economically beneficial
as the decision of General Lucius Clay directing the local governments
to freely admit refugee-craftsmen, irrespective of the state's economic
need.16 The Federal Constitution 17 guarantees to all Germans the fred-
dom to elect their occupation and their place of work. In view of
substantial economic strides made under the Clay decision, some
courts have interpreted this constitutional rule as a complete barrier
to new statutory restraint in the admission to occupation. The statute
regulating craftsmanship follows the principle of freedom of action
but with certain compromising tendencies. 18 Despite these compromise
provisions the law has been generally interpreted as keeping the lines
of trade free from governmental regulation.19 A movement led by
retail firms to regulate, once more, admission to the retail trade was
defeated, largely through the efforts of Ludwig Erhard, Germany's
16. BOLDT, GEWERBEORDNUNG UND GEWERBERECHTLICHE NEBENGESETZE 445, 485
(L. ed. 1956).
17. Art. 12 Grundgesetz (GG).
18. Statute regulating craftsmanship (Handwerksordnung) of September 14,
1953 (BGBl. I. 1411).
19. 11 D. VOLKSWIRT 2406 (1957). Craftsmanship in Germany remains a
major force. In 1956 Germany had 751,599 "craft" firms with 3624 million
employees, or 15 such firms per 1000 inhabitants. -
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Minister of Economics. 20 It is necessary to keep these facts in mind
before one evaluates the new statute. Its language allows the execu-
tive and the courts much latitude in its enforcement and they may be
influenced by these existing trends.
Scope of Application
As in the United States, public regulation of many fields of business
limits substantially the field in which the competitive order is main-
tained and in which the cartel statute is to be applied or fully applied.
There are express exemptions as well as practical limitations to the
impact of the statute. The statute itself enumerates those fields which
are fully or partially excepted from its operation. Many of these are
also subject to special regulation in the United States. The fields of
energy (electricity, water, gas, atomic power) ,21 insurance and banks,22
railroads, airlines, shipping and mail,23 and agriculture 24 are exempted
since fully regulated on the basis of a planned economy. In these fields
the agencies dealing with "cartels" can intervene only if special abuses
can be shown, and then only with the co-operation of the agencies
entrusted with the general supervision of these fields. The American
law on insurance and banking shows similar methods. Coal and steel
are to a large extent subject to special rules of competition and cartels,
provided for in chapter VI of the Treaty on the European Steel and
Coal Community of April 18, 1951.25 Also all fields affected by the
integration into the European Common Market (infra) may, concur-
rently with the German statute, be subject to the rules of competition
and restraint of competition contained in article 85 of the Treaty of
the European Common Market.
The entire field of labor relations is outside the Act. The Minister
of Economics pointed out that German labor law is based on the free-
dom of association and the idea of the contracting parties, i.e., labor
and management, being free to set their own labor rules without gov-
ernmental interference. The factual impact of the substantially monop-
olistic labor union (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) on competition is
not covered by the statute. Statutes have given this single union a
fifty per cent participation in the management of steel and coa 20 and
an influence in the election of one-third of the members of the board
of supervisors, entrusted with election and supervision of management
20. TUCHFELDT, GEWERBEFREIInMT ALS WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHES PROBLEM 80
(1955).
21. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY § 101 (1957).
22. Id. 4 102.
23. Id. § 99.
24. Id. § 100.
25. II BGB1. 445 (1952).
26. Letter of the Federal Minister of Economics to a number of attorneys,
July 21, 1956, reprinted in WuW BWM 41 (1957).
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in other corporations. 27 These facts point up a potential trend in the
direction of concentration which, up to now, has not been, followed.
Section 98 (1) of the statute declares the act applicable to enter-
prises, fully or partially owned, administered or run by governmental
agencies. However, the actual enforcement of the statute against those
enterprises is bound to be influenced by the fact that local and state
governments have very large shares in the ownership of business, e.g.,
forty per cent of the automobile production, eighty-five per cent
of aluminum, seventy-five per cent of lignite. In these fields prosecu-
tion may not be aggressive because politically inexpedient.
Basic Provisions
The statute provides, in a nutshell, the following: (1) Horizontal
cartels are unlawful unless expressly permitted by statute or licensed
under special statutory authorization. Insofar as they are permitted,
they may be dissolved by decree whenever abuses occur or the period
for which the license has been granted comes to an end. (2) In the
field of vertical restraints resale price maintenance is lawful if mini-
mum requirements are fulfflled;2 exclusive dealing arrangements or
tying contracts are permissible and may be enjoined only if they un-
fairly restrict certain persons and substantially lessen competition. 29
Otherwise vertical agreements leading to restraints are void.30 (3)
Enterprises which have a position of market domination are subject
to special supervision; they may not acquire additional footholds in
such markets unless licensed.
3t
Substantive law is so closely interrelated with its enforcement that
an American observer can successfully evaluate these rules only if
he realizes that these rules are being executed in a society which
has no: (a) courts of equity which may prevent the recurrence of
violation of the law and establish conditions consistent with the law;
(b) watchdog administrative agencies of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion type; (c) congressional hearings to examine the law on the basis
of past experience.
The German statute-to be interpreted under German procedural
and administrative organization-uses the following methods of execu-
tion:
(1) Agreements or acts declared unlawful by the statute cannot
be enforced by any ordinary court or arbitration tribunal.32 Any act
27. Statute as to codetermination in Coal and Steel of May 24, 1951, BGB1.
1 347.
28. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY §§ 16, 17 (1957).
29. Id. § 18.
30. Id. § 15.
31. Id. §§ 22, 23.
32. Id. § 91.
1958]
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of discrimination or threat designed to bring about results outlawed
by the statute,33 or any inducement of others to boycott, can be prose-
cuted.3
4
(2) Fines (not of criminal law character) may be imposed, on
motion of the executive agency, by the Court of Appeals in Berlin
(Kammergericht)3 5 on anyone who acts, intentionally or negligently,
in a manner inconsistent with the statute or decree issued there-
under.36
(3) A Cartel Office,37 established in Berlin under general super-
vision and instruction of the lMinister of Economics, may license cer-
tain acts or agreements-3 or declare unlawful and enjoin certain acts
or agreements39 or raise objections within a definite period of time
against certain otherwise lawful acts or agreements. 40 The Cartel Office
may command the doing of a positive act in but one case: it may
demand the acceptance of an enterprise as a member of a professional
or trade association. Under supervision of the Cartel Office trade
practice rules may be provided for.41 The decree and decisions of
the Cartel Office are subject to judicial review of the Kammergericht2
and eventually of the Bundesgericht.43
(4) The Federal Minister of Economics, in addition to his general
power of supervision over the Cartel Office, may, subject to judicial
review, grant emergency licenses.44
(5) Private suits for damages may be brought against cartel mem-
bers (jointly) or dominating enterprises who intentionally or negli-
gently violate the statute or a decree issued thereunder, "provided the
aim of the pertinent statutory provision is the protection of this
particular plaintiff.'' 45
Horizontal Agreements
This paper is principally devoted to a discussion of the horizontal
agreement. Horizontal agreements in restraint of competition, or a
recasting of organization having the same effect, whatever their form,
are covered by the German concept "cartel." Vertical command, as
33. Id. § 25.
34. Id. § 16.
35. In case the state cartel agency acts, the fine is imposed by the state Court
of Appeal.
36. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY §§ 38(1), 81
(1957). *
37. Id. § 84.
38. Id. §§ 4,5,6(2), 7.
39. Id. §§ 12(2), 17, 18, 22, 23.
40. Id. §§ 2 (3), 3 (3).
41. Id. § 28.
42. Id. § 62(D).
43. Id. § 73.
44. Id. § 8.
45. Id. § 35.
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for example in a "combine," 46 does not establish a "cartel." The prin-
cipal rule as to cartels is to be found in section 1 under the heading
"Cartel Agreements and Cartel Resolutions," which reads as follows:
Agreements entered by enterprises or associations of enterprises for
the purpose of accomplishing a common purpose, as well as resolutions
of associations of enterprises, are ineffective, as far as they are adapted
to influence, by restraint of competition, production or market conditions
in the trade in merchandise or commercial services. This rule is not
applicable if legal rules provide otherwise.47
This formula represents a compromise between the "Boehm-draft,"
asking for a general prohibition of all cartels, and the "Isay-draft,"
which, in harmony with traditional German policy, would legalize
cartels unless abuse of power is shown. In spite of the more compli-
cated language, section 1 establishes the same principle as section 1
of the Sherman Act. The use of the concept "competition" instead of
"trade" has more ideological than practical importance.
Section 1 covers all types of "contracts" and "resolutions" tradition-
ally used in Germany for the purpose of cartelization such as the out-
right agreement between competitors to restrain competition, the
inclusion of provisions in a corporate statute which binds all share-
holders to a certain method of use of their products, or the agreement
to buy or sell through joint agencies. The use of certain organizational
set-ups such as the incorporated association48 does not give legal
shields against the application of the act. The fact that the members
are being bound is decisive, whatever the mechanism.
It should be noted that the rule refers to "enterprises" rather than
persons. The precise meaning of this term must soon be resolved, for
the problem of "intercombine" agreements (between two members
of the same "combine family") is bound to arise. The concept "enter-
prise" should include the integrated combine as a whole, therefore,
intra-combine agreements are not covered by section 1, while agree-
ments between combines or corporations belonging to different com-
bines are subject to this provision.
The Cartel Office and courts must soon determine whether section 1
embraces only those agreements which "actually" restrict competition
or covers all agreements which "may tend" to restrict competition.
Under the former interpretation all "small" cartels would be exempt
from the law since their actual effect on competition would be neg-
46. A "combine" may be defined as an economic entity, vertical in structure*
and comprised of corporations, partnerships or other business associations uni--
fled in a central authority by various legal devices.




ligible.49 This interpretation, it is feared, would tend to subvert the
underlying policies and purposes of the act. Under the latter view,
all "cooperatives," which of their nature "may tend" to restrict com-
petition, but which are of vital importance to Germany in the craft
and consumer goods industry, would appear to be per se illegal. But
a reasonable solution of the co-operative problem may be found with-
out sacrificing the substance of section 1. An instance is reported 0 in
which the leading agricultural association of Germany had established
a "milk support fund" to be administered by a managing corporation.
The Minister of Economics refused to recognize this fund as a new
enterprise since one of its purposes was to keep goods in storage to
regulate. the market in the interest of its members. The Government
thus recognizes that a "new enterprise" must come into being as a
distinct economic entity, with its own goodwill and as an independent
participant in competition. By this interpretation a sound distinction
can; be made between co-operatives which have the character of a
cartel and those which have not.
Section 151 declares agreements of a restrictive character "ineffec-
tive." Unfortunately, section 1 does not use the word "void." In Ger-
man legal language agreements are called "for the time ineffective"
(schwebend unwirksam) whenever the final effectiveness requires
the license of a governmental agency or the approval of another per-
son such as a principal or guardian.5 2 Generally, grant of approval or
license legalizes the agreement retroactively as of the date of entering
the approved or licensed agreement.53 If, however, the license or ap-
proval is denied, the agreement is considered void ab initio.54 It is
essential to know whether the word "ineffective" in section 1 has this
technical meaning; if it has, all cartel agreements for which a license
may be obtained, are not void or illegal so long as the decision on the
license is pending and every party violating the terms of an agreement
"for the time ineffective" risks liablity if the license is granted later.
The courts may be called upon to decide these issues, then, (1) If
the Cartel Office asks the Court of Appeals Berlin (Kammergericht)
to impose a fine on the ground that a partner to an agreement has
performed such agreement before the grant of a license, (2) if a part-
49. See LANGEN, DAS KARTELLGESETZ 5 (1957).
50. Request of the BWM (Bundeswirtschaftsministerium) to the Deutscher
Bauernverband. April 4, 1956.
51. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc or GERMANY § 1 (1957).
52. A typical instance is to be found in § 108 I BGB: "Whenever a minor
enters an agreement without the required approval of the guardian the
effectiveness of the agreement depends on the approval of the guardian."
The courts interpreted the license of a governmental agency, e.g., having
jurisdiction over currency matters, as parallel to the case of approval of a
guardian. Palandt, § 134(2)b.
53. I BGB § 184 (1952).
54. RG 162, 1: BGH 1, 302.
[VOL. 11
THE GERMAN CARTEL STATUTE
ner to such an agreement is sued after the license is granted for dam-
ages resulting from acts committed during the preliminary period, or
(3) if, during the critical period, a petition for an injunction is brought
by one of the partners against the other partners.
Since the statute liberally allows the granting of licenses, temporary
lawfulness may develop in a host of cases. The Cartel Office may grant
licenses for horizontal agreements:
(1) to meet a decrease of sales resulting from a substantial change
of demand, "provided the cartel appears to be necessary to accomplish
a planned adaptation of capacity to the new demand and the regula-
tion takes place under full consideration of public welfare and national
economy"; 55
(2) to accomplish a substantial increase of the capacity of the par-
ticipating enterprises by means of better technique, efficiency and
organization and to improve thereby the supply of necessary goods
and provisions;56
(3) to regulate competition in foreign markets, even if the domestic
market is affected;
57
(4) to regulate imports.5 8 In an exceptional case the Alinister of
Economics himself may grant a license to any cartel whenever the
restraint of competition appears to be necessary to support prevailing
interests of "public welfare and national economics." 59 Furthermore,
certain cartels become "effective" if, within a period of three months
after the filing of an agreement with the Cartel Office, no objection is
raised to agreed uniform conditions of sale, which shall not include
price fixing6° and agreed grants of discount as consideration for special
services.
6 '
In all these cases the "ineffectiveness" issue may be raised. What,
during the pre-license period, or the period during which the cartel
remains subject to governmental objection are the obligations of the
partners to each other and to the Cartel Office? The clarification of
this issue will be symptomatic of the general interpretation of the
statute. Analysis may also shed light on the German legal approach
to problems of statutory interpretation.
It is suggested that the courts may adopt the following approach:
The prevailing rule as to the economic order is the outlawing of cartels.
This rule is in force unless the questioned activity is exempt or stat-
55. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 4 (1957).
56. Id. § 5 (Rationalisierungs Kartell).
57. Id. § 6 II (Export Kartell mit Inlandwir Kung).
58. Id. § 7.
59. Id. § 8.
60. Id. § 2 (Konditionen Kartell).
61. Id. § 3 (Rabatt Kartell).
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utorily authorized. One of the purposes of the licensing system is to
have a careful investigation in advance of any interference in the
prevailing order. It might therefore be logical to decide that-until
the license is granted-no agreement comes into force and no one is
bound before this date. However, this interpretation is excluded by
the language of the rule of section 13 II, which provides that in all
cases of eventual licensing under section 8 each participant in the
agreement may rescind the agreement for cause. Since it is not possible
to withdraw from non-existing agreements, we are unable to say that
nothing is binding before the grant of the license. The question re-
mains in what manner are the parties bound? Full weight should be
given to the importance of the right of partners to rescind the agree-
ment under section 13. Full weight should as well be given to the
fact that, under sections 2 and 3, agreements effecting condition
cartels and discount cartels are not effective until the end of the three-
month period. It is apparent that the legislature, which does not re-
quire a positive license in the latter case, considers it less dangerous
and gives it automatic effect if no objection is filed within three
months. Since, before the end of the period, the agreement is entirely
ineffective, the partners would be entirely free during that time. But
the traditional meaning of "ineffective until licensing" in the more
dangerous cases would have a far-reaching effect. If a party may be
retroactively bound, and then sued for a breach of contract occuring
during the preliminary period, he cannot dare risk noncompliance
during that period. Such an agreement would be, as a practical matter,
fully effective. That, surely, cannot be the intention of the statute. A
more logical view is that during the preliminary period the only legal
duty imposed upon the parties is that of cooperation in the prosecution
of the license application; under this view, licensed cartel agreements
would become effective only upon approval and without retroactive
effect, just as are the automatically approved agreements.
The American reader may feel that I have unduly belabored a rather
technical point of law. I do this only because I am convinced of its
real and practical importance. Cartel-minded contractors will un-
doubtedly attempt to coerce compliance during the preliminary period
on the basis of the traditional meaning of the term "ineffective." The
problem will bulk large in future litigation.
Statutory Exemptions and Licenses
An American observer who reads the list of possible licenses, ex-
press or implied, and the statutory exemptions will find them rather
far-reaching. One has to consider, however, that statutory rules to
be executed by an executive agency, under ministerial instructions,
[VOL. 11
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have to be very definite, since continental administrative law accords
limited discretion to the administrator. Many points have to be ex-
pressly stated which American law has left to the determination of
the courts at a later date.
The most far-reaching power of the Minister of Economics which
permits him to grant a license without co-operation of the Cartel
Office if restraint of competition appears to be necessary to support
prevailing interests of public welfare and national economy,62 calls
for special explanation. Section 8 itself contains the warning that this
power shall only be exercised in a case in which one is confronted with
an immediate danger to a part of the economy, and if other statutory or
political measures cannot be applied or at least not be applied in time
and if restraint of competition is adapted to overcome the danger.
The license shall only be granted in particular cases of far-reaching
impact. The American practice as applied in the Suez crisis shows
that extreme national emergencies may call for temporary exceptions
not otherwise authorized by statute. The so-called "Legalitatsprinzip"
binds a German public official to apply statutory rules to all facts
which become known to him. Apparently section 8 is to be applied
only in similar emergency situations such as, for example, an infla-
tionary situation following the outbreak of a brush fire war.
Once the Cartel Office has been in operation for some time, uni-
lateral interference by the Minister of Economics under section 8
should become impractical since in Germany, even more than else-
where, existing administrative machinery has a substantial weight
of its own, demanding recognition and consultation before steps in
its administrative area are taken.
Among other exceptions the American observer will find a familiar
one: the Webb-Pomerene type of association. The act permits agree-
ments in restraint of competition which promote -the maintenance
and increase of exports into markets outside of Western Germany.6
The German export cartel exemption goes beyond the American ex-
emption. A German export cartel may enter into agreements with
foreign enterprises as to a foreign market. An export cartel having
no domestic effects becomes effective in Germany upon the filing of a
pertinent report with the Cartel Office.64 This office, however, shall
grant ("hat zu erteilen") a license to enter export cartels, even if
62. Id. § 8.
63. The statutes enacted in the German Federal Republic give consideration
to the division of Germany by speaking of the "Territories in which this
statute is to be applied." In the text for purposes of clarification we speak
of Western Germany.




they have domestic effect, provided such regulation is necessary to
maintain the intended regulation of the foreign markets (markets
outside Western Germany).65 Therefore, the German licensee may
enter into agreements dividing world markets.
It is obvious that in this latter case a heavy burden is imposed upon
the Cartel Office. Many petitions no doubt will be filed under section
6 II on the ground that the markets, for instance, of Switzerland,
Austria and England (not included in the European market treaty)
have to be regulated despite domestic effects. The determination of
the Cartel Office as to whether the domestic effect is necessary to
accomplish the effect in the foreign market has to be difficult, espe-
cially if foreign and domestic producers join. Cartel experts know that
restrictive agreements entered into between domestic and foreign
enterprises usually have domestic effects, indeed would never be
made without them. Why should foreign and domestic partners join
if not both effects are reached? The Cartel Office under this formula
will therefore have to approve many such export cartels.
In section 6 III the Cartel Office is instructed, however, that it "shall"
not grant such licenses, whenever the agreement may lead to a "sub-
stantial" restraint of competition within Western Germany. The
interest in maintaining a domestic competitive economy prevails over
the interest in foreign regulation. Furthermore, no domestic regula-
tion whatever is permissible unless it is necessary to accomplish the
planned regulation of foreign markets. The Cartel Office, which must
apply these principles to a factual situation, will find itself in a pre-
carious position. The tests will necessitate most difficult value judg-
ments. The pressure on the Office will be very strong.66
Section 1 permits, under license, cartels between importers, "if the
German buyers do not find substantial competition between sellers."
In the raw materials field, especially in the field of coal, one finds
import cartels which are at the same time export cartels. The Ameri-
can observer will find the eventual strengthening of coal-import car-
tels of importance since at this time America is the principal supplier
of coal which is not sufficiently produced within the territory of the
European Coal and Steel Community. The recent appearance of Polish
coal in world markets makes import cartels especially important since
dealing with governmental monopolies of the Polish type cannot take
65. Id. § 6 II.
66. Interesting examples are to be found in the practice of the BWM under
the Allied legislation: BWM 38: License of IX/17/1956 to ten German pro-
ducers of aluminum foil to join a European cartel; BWM 55: License of
1/12/1957 to an association for the support of export of iron bathtubs; BWM
57: License of 1/1/1957 granted to six "Hauer"-exporters to enter an export
cartel. These licenses provide that in case of enactment of the German cartel
statute a new license is to be applied for as far as required under the statute.
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place on a competitive basis and necessarily calls for cartelization.
The provisions on export and import cartels pose interesting ques-
tions from an American point of view. Some European writers have
recently most bitterly attacked the alleged extraterritorial effect of
American antitrust legislation. But the German statute and other
European trade regulation statutes show that such extraterritorial
effect is a logical result of such legislation in an influential com-
mercial nation.
Section 98 II of the German statute states expressly: "This statute
is applicable to all restraints of competition which have an effect in
territory for which this statute has been enacted (Western Germany),
even if they are the result of actions which take place outside of this
territory." Does that mean that American Webb-Pomerene organiza-
tions exporting goods to Germany may be subject to the German
statute? Does the American rule on extraterritorial effect mean that
German import coal cartels or licensed or permissible export cartels
are subject to the American statute? At present no general answer
can be given, but under certain conditions, it may well be that Ger-
man exportand import cartels lawful under their statute, are subject
to attack in the United States, while American organizations such as
those in the coal field may be subject to investigation under German
law.
The problem of export and import cartels under sections 6 and 7
is of special importance in view of the Treaty on the European Com-
mon Market of March 25, 1957. The treaty, which came into operation
on the same day as the Cartel Statute, on Jan. 1, 1958, contains far-
reaching rules on competition. It has become German domestic law.
In regard to export and import cartels the specific question arises:
can the automatic legalization of export cartels having no domestic
effect, or the legalization of other cartels by license, take place when-
ever exports to or imports from the five other partner nations67 are
involved? If so, the cartel expert may easily employ export or import
cartels to subvert the basic purpose of the European treaty, which
is gradually to abolish tariffs and quantitative restrictions in European
trade.
One of the most discussed questions today is whether the European
treaty has any immediate effect on export or import cartels in Ger-
many or in any of the other member nations. The language of sections
6 and 7 of the cartel statute does not appear to be helpful. Section 6
III forbids the issuance of a license to an export cartel affecting
domestic trade if such issuance is contrary to principles contained in
German international agreements. No reference is found in section 7
67. France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg.
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(import cartels) or in section 6 I ("pure" export cartels having no
domestic effect). The definite rules of the European Treaty, as pro-
vided in section 85, outlaw all attempts to bring back restraints in
"inter-European trade" by cartels, which have been abolished by the
general commercial provisions of the treaty. The general rule of
section 85 (1) outlaws
all agreements between enterprises or resolutions of associations of
enterprises or behavior of enterprises co-ordinated with each other, which
are adapted to restraint of trade between member nations and which aim
at or effect a prohibition, restraint or falsification of competition within
the common market.
All these agreements are declared "inconsistent with the common
market" and are, therefore, prohibited. On the list of examples we
find: "Restraint or control of production, markets, technical progress
or of investments"68 and "division of markets or of sources of supply., 69
No doubt, export or import cartels lawful under sections 6 and 7 would
become unlawful in Germany, insofar as trade with the member na-
tions is involved. However, it is argued that section 87 (1) provides
that the Council (the executive agency of the common market) shall,
within a period of three years, or after the end of this period with a
qualified majority, issue "all decrees and rules necessary for the real-
ization of section 85" and that, therefore, until the issue of these rules,
no European law as to competition is in existence. This position has
been presented in different member countries by several writers.70
However, the member governments cannot overlook the fact that
section 88 obliges each of them to decide on the legality of agreements,
resolutions and commercial behavior in conformity with their own
rules of law and the provisions of section 85 "until the enactment of
rules under section 87." It is suggested, though not without hesitation,
that Germany is bound to adapt the execution of sections 6 and 7 of
the cartel statute to the needs of the common market. This means that
whatever steps have been taken under the commercial policy of the
European Treaty cannot be set back by arrangements of export or
import cartel character.
We turn now to other cartels subject to licenses, most of which are
of a basically domestic character. An important exemption is that
accorded a "rationalization" cartel,7 1 that is, a cartel adapted to raise
68. TREATY ON THE EunoPEAN COMMON MARKET, March 25, 1957; "CARTEL
STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY, §§ 85(a), 85 (b).
69. Id. § 85(1) (c).
70. SPENGLER, GuTACHTEN zu SEC. 85 FR DES EUROPA-VERTRAGES (Veroeffent-
lichurg des Bundes der Deutschen Industrie).
71. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLic OF GERMANY § 5 (1957)
(Rationalisierungs Kartell).
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substantially the capacity or efficiency of the participating enterprises
and thereby more effectively meet demand. Again we find the Cartel
Office operating under the vaguest instructions: "the result of such
rationalization must remain in a reasonable ratio to the restraint of
competition resulting from it."72
A typical technique employed in compromise legislation is that of
connecting a most far-reaching rule with a perfectly harmless pro-
vision, although the two rules have really nothing in common. We
find the provision on "rationalization cartels" following the provision
permitting horizontal agreements for the purpose of establishing a
uniform application of standards often declared lawful in the United
States under the "rule of reason." A rationalization cartel is related
to this type of cartel only in that both relate to rational action. It is
feared that a large number of traditional cartels will find protection
under section 5 I. The recent practice of the Minister of Economics
gives a good indication of the line to be expected. On May 29, 1957,
shortly before the final adoption of the statute by the Bundestag, the
Ministry granted a license to a cartel of this type. Deringer, in his
annotation,7 3 points out that section 5 II closely follows the language of
the original legislative draft upon which the decision was based. It is
to be expected, therefore, that the Cartel Office will follow a similar
line. In the cited case the licensed agreement permitted seventy per
cent of all producers of "pottery" to use the device of a joint sales
agency as well as limited methods of quotas and price fixing. Under
the agreement the joint sales agency, the Steinzeug-Handelsgesell-
schaft m.b.H. in Hannover, may enter into exclusive agency contracts
with each producer who undertakes to pay a contractual fine of triple
the price of goods sold through other channels. While generally the
customer may name the producer whose products he would like to
receive, the agent selects the producer if the customer is silent. The
agent "is obliged to distribute the order among the enterprises repre-
sented by him under full consideration of their capacity to supply those
goods." The agent is bound to give the producer proof that on the basis
of his capacity he has been given full consideration. If the producer can
prove that he has not been given full consideration, he may terminate
this contract upon the giving of three-months notice. The agreement
can only be performed if the agent has an agreed list of capacities and
quotas. In preparation for execution of such a program the producer is
bound to submit statistics on the availabla stocks and-on the program of
production. The price fixing is accomplished by a uniform price list
prepared by the agent, who may only raise prices if seventy-five per
cent of the producers of the goods sold during the last year desires it
72. Id. § 5 II.
73. Com. WuW BWM 87 (1957).
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or decrease prices if twenty-five per cent suggest such action.
Section 5 (3) of the statute permits utilization of the syndicate
device 74 only
whenever the purpose of rationalization cannot be accomplished other-
wise, provided the rationalization is desirable in the public interest and
if the success of rationalization stands in a reasonable ratio to the restraint
of competition resulting from it.
In the Steinzeug agreement it has been assumed (1) that supply of a
sufficient number of different types and qualities could only be guaran-
teed through centralization; (2) that centralization is needed to
reasonably utilize the means of transportation and to bring about a
proper distribution of orders. The cartel section of the Ministry of
Economics felt that this situation justified the grant of a license. The
government, however, imposed the condition that customers are to
be supplied under the same conditions, in the scope of the capacity
of the producers, and under consideration of the economic urgency
of the supply.
A "rationalization" cartel can be licensed whenever it appears to
be in the interest of a reasonable development of industry. There need
be no economic emergency or crisis. However, the statute does provide
for two cases of licensing in emergency situations.
We have already referred to the extraordinary power of the Minister
of Economics under section 8. Another type of emergency license may
be granted by the Cartel Office in the case of the so-called "crisis car-
tels" (Strukturkrisenkartell). The language of section 4, in which
this form of a cartel is provided for, would not be sufficient in itself,
if we were not provided with the background of the statute published
by the committee which prepared it. Section 4 sets out the following
requirements for the grant of this license:
(1) The existence of a substantial (nachhaltig) change in demand
for a product and a decrease of the turnover resulting from such
change.
(2) The necessity of such a horizontal agreement to accomplish
a planned adaptation of the capacity to the demand.
(3) A desirable effect of granting the license, taking into considera-
tion the public welfare and the national economy. The official reason-
ing points out: 75
The grant of the license under section 4 cannot be justified by every
74. A "syndicate device" may be defined as a central buying or selling
organization in restraint of trade.
75. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 4, comment
p. 26 (1957).
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decrease of turnover. It is necessary to establish that the emergency is
the result of economic developments in the course of the ups and downs
of the business cycle.
This means that such decrease of the turnover is of temporary nature.
A license shall not be granted whenever a definite change of the de-
mand develops, for instance, as a result of a final change in consumer
demand or in the pattern of raw material supply. Cartels under section
4 are not supposed to be a remedy whenever structural changes of the
economy disturb particular enterprises or even entire fields of in-
dustry. Langen refers to a recent case in the flour industry.7
6
The observer of cartel development may suggest that very often
conditions which do not justify the grant of a license under section 4
will be presented to the Cartel Office under section 5, under which the
applicant for a license has to present much less evidence in regard
to the causes of the difficulties. Section 5 practically places the burden
on the Cartel Office to show that the grant of the license would inter-
fere more with the general competitive economy than is justified by
the particular interest of the petitioners. As explained in the commit-
tee reports the burden is on the petitioner to show that the economic
causes of his- trouble are exactly those which are outlined in section 4.
This close relation between these two types of cartels, i.e., sections 4
and 5, touches a problem which, because of the many different forms of
lawful, permissible or licensed horizontal agreements, will undoubt-
edly assume considerable importance in the practice of the German
cartel lawyers.
Uniform Conditions of Sale
Up to now we have discussed problems relating to quantity or
quality, to production or marketing. We now consider restraints in
conditions of sale.
The statute provides for monitoring of agreements on uniform con-
ditions of sale (Konditionenkartell), with the exception of price-fixing
agreements, 77 and the supervision of so-called discount cartels (Rabatt-
kartell) .8 The Cartel Office can prevent the legalization of such cartels
by filing objections within a period of three months after such agree-
ments have been reported.79 The objection of the Cartel Office against
the Konditionenkartelle may only be based on "abuse of the market
position resulting from such cartel" or if the agreements are in viola-
tion of any "international agreements which Germany entered and
76. Gesetz 67, 68, discussing § 4.
77. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 2 (1957).
78. Id. § 3.
79. Id. § 9.
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which are inconsistent with Konditionenkartellen."8°
Uniform conditions of sale are of more significance in Germany
than similar agreements would be in the United States. In Germany,
for several decades, each large enterprise has sold exclusively under
its own conditions of sale which are usually printed on the back of the
order or its acceptance. The courts have supported the development
of this custom by declaring these conditions binding, for example, on
a buyer who, at an earlier date, did business with the seller under the
buyer's general conditions,81 or in the field of banking, insurance and
transportation. Support of this custom was extended even to customers
who had never received a copy of these conditions of business on the
ground that customers have to expect that businessmen in these fields
will not act otherwise.8 2 The courts have given support to horizontal
agreements on uniform conditions of sale, generally legalized by
section 2, by holding that published conditions agreed on by associa-
tions are binding on buyers from a member since buyers should realize
that such member, presumed to be loyal to his cartel obligation, would
never do business unless under the conditions of his cartel.8 These
conditions of business are based on the fact that most rules of the Civil
Code, i.e., those on sales, are binding, if the parties to the contract
have not declared otherwise. The associations try to minimize risks to
the buyer or customer resulting from transactions. The courts in
supporting this development have on the other hand reserved the
right to examine the contents of these conditions where the public
interest or the interests of the parties involved require protection or
limitation.8 4 The uniform condition of the freight companies (Allge-
meine Spediteurbedingungen) shows how much disagreement can de-
velop in regard to the determination whether in a particular case
the private and public interests are sufficiently protected.85 The im-
portance of these problems grows, if associations of businessmen of
different levels consort to agree on uniform conditions of sale. If it
should be, for instance, lawful for the retailers, wholesalers and pro-
ducers of the electrical industry to agree on uniform conditions cover-
ing the entire trade, the consumer could be placed in a rather pre-
carious position. Section 2 speaks of uniform conditions without giving
any determination of how far this uniformity may go. Whenever
leading enterprises of different levels join in the preparation of uni-
80. Id. §§ 2, 12.
81. SCHLEGELBERGER, nI HANDELSGESETZBUCH § 346 n. 30 (3 ed.).
82. RGZ 170, 233; 171, 43; BGHZ 12m 136.
83. RGZ 95, 93 and 112, 2581; compare for the entire problem RAISER, DAS
RECHT DER ALLGEmEINEN GESCHAPTSBEDINGUNGEN (1935).
84. SCHLEGELBERGER, op. cit. supra note 81, at § 346 n. 32.
85. The Federal Court decided that these conditions are unobjedtionable.
GH1BZ 9, 1; 12, 136. Leading experts disagree.
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form conditions of sale, entire fields of industry and trade have prac-
tically a sales law of their own, usually interpreted by arbitration
tribunals organized by or in co-operation with the trade associations.
These arbitration tribunals remain fully permissible under the act.
Section 91, which grants parties to arbitration the right to call on the
ordinary courts, refers only to litigation between cartel members but
not to litigation between cartel members and their customers.
The Cartel Office may intervene here, by filing objections within
the three-month period86 or by decree of prohibition87 only, if "the
agreements and resolutions or the method of their performance
amount to an abuse of the market position resulting from the per-
tinent license in disregard of the general rule of section 1." Years ago
I suggested that the concept of "abuse" as a test of cartel control
imposes an unbearable burden on agencies of supervision.P How far
may the participants cover different market levels? How much risk
is the minimum risk to be assumed? Will the requirement of section
2 that the draftsmen of uniform conditions give a proper hearing to
parties in interest help the public or all parties involved or operate
as an invitation to inclusion of all possible levels into the agreement?
Today, we can do no more than raise these questions. It remains to be
seen, whether, in the case of uniform conditions, the courts will main-
tain the power of control which they assumed before, or whether as
a result of the statute it will be considered the exclusive right of the
Cartel Office to intervene in cases of abuse.8 9 The argument that
courts must now withdraw from this field is to be expected.
Discount Cartels
While horizontal agreements on uniform conditions of sale shall not
influence the fixing of prices or of any element of prices,90 the so-
called discount cartel (Rabattkartell) 91 does have such effect, at least
as far as the supply to wholesalers is concerned. Discount cartels will
continue to be a source of litigation since section 3 declares them law-
ful if the Cartel Office does not file objections within three months
after the filing of the implementing report. The eventual legalization
of the discount cartel requires that the agreed discounts amount to a
"genuine consideration and do not lead to an unjustified discrimination
of certain economic levels or consumers belonging to such levels, who
86. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY § 2 III (1957).
87. Id. § 12 I.
88. Kronstein & Leighton, Cartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YALE L.J.
297 (1946).
89. See "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 12 (1957).
90. Id. § 2.
91. Id. § 3.
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give the same consideration to the suppliers."9 2 Originally it was the
express intention to avoid any statutory solution; thus following simi-
lar provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act. Opposition to following the
Robinson-Patman Act was based on the opinion that any prohibition
of selling to various customers at different prices would lead to uni-
form prices. Will the discount cartel have an opposite effect? Under
section 3 is the express statement that these horizontal agreements
may only regulate "discounts given for special performances or serv-
ices excludes agreements calling for no discounts at all or discounts
irrespective of consideration." However, the argument has already
been presented that the alleged purpose of section 3 (to exclude com-
petition between manufacturers regarding the temptations offered to
wholesalers by fixing discounts to be offered) cannot be realized unless
the prohibition of discounts not covered by the concept of "discount
for consideration" can also be agreed on and that, therefore, section
3 gives implied consent to this type of arrangement.
The concept "discount for consideration" is bound to raise difficulties
of interpretation. At this point, it is sufficient to refer to quantity
and functional discounts. In spite of the entirely different approach
of the Robinson-Patman Act which obliges the merchant, as a matter
of law, to give the same prices and the same discounts to every buyer,
the American material on quantity discounts may be helpful. In both
systems, the decisive point is whether a quantity discount is actually
justified by cost-savings. Functional discounts, especially those in favor
of the wholesaler, are brought under the concept "discount for consid-
eration" by referring to the cost-savings which allegedly result from
the fact that, for example, the selling manufacturer is not required to
build up an expensive system of distribution. The problem presented
by merchants who are at the same time wholesalers and retailers will
have to be solved in the cartel rules without coming into conflict with
the prohibition of discrimination. The Cartel Office is bound to raise ob-
jections against the cartel if participants in the pertinent market prove,
within a month after the fiing of the agreement, that the agreement
subjects them to unjustified discrimination.93 Even later, the Cartel
Office, on its own motion, may declare the agreement ineffective by
reason of discrimination.94 The powerful consumers' co-operative is
expected to present difficulties in this area. For years this organization
complained that industry discriminated against it by giving functional
discounts to large wholesale organizations which are linked up with
retailers while the co-operative did not receive similar discounts.
Under section 3 the discount cartel agreement has to establish clear
92. Id. § 3 I.
93. Id. §§ 3. 3 III.
94. Id. § 3 IV.
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definitions applicable to everyone. Futhermore, the report filed in the
making of such agreement has to give proof, "that persons on the
economic levels, to be affected by the discount regulation, have been
given a proper hearing." The co-operatives feel assured that they will
be among the organizations to be invited,95 and the cartel expert ex-
pects them to be among the cartel members so as to avoid serious
clashes of interests.
Soelter suggests that discount cartels-as we have considered in
regard to "Konditionenkartelle"-may be established on different
levels.9 6 If Soelter is right, even without a license, the entire trade
from producer to retailer may be bound to maintain a uniform dis-
count level. In that case the entire problem of resale price main-
tenance would change its character, since, even in non-trade-mark
articles, the retailers would be bound to each other and to the whole-
salers and their organization to keep their discounts within the same
level. Whenever entire fields of trade are at the same time subject to
both discount and "Konditionen" cartels not much flexibility would
be left. The argument is made that this system would lead to real
competition by better service and performance (Leistungswettbew-
erb). Indeed, the typical Robinson-Patman Act problems- "discrim-
ination" and "meeting competition"--are successfully avoided, pro-
vided the entire trade follows the cartel policy, but at the expense of
abolition of price competition in these fields. The modern industrial
experience in which many industries have, from time to time, quanti-
ties of products which must be brought to the customers quickly ff
overcrowded storages are to be avoided, will foster the finding of loop-
holes in the law as before. Small business complains, with some
justification, that many large enterprises and governmental offices buy
cheaper as a result of quantity discounts and distribute it among their
employees, who, in turn, supply their friends and relations.9 7 The
Rabattgesetz of 1933, which continues to affect discounts given by
wholesalers and producers in their direct sale to the last consumer,
does not help the retailer. Furthermore in certain fields, such as gaso-
line, an extensive outsider-business appeared on the market (Georg
von Opel). It is not expected that discount cartels will attack .these
two problems.
Licenses of Industrial Property Rights
The cartel history shows that from the beginning of cartels in-
dustrial property regulations, especially with regard to patents, have
95. PAULS, ZiTm NEUEN KARTELLGESETZ, BLATTER FUR GENOSSENSCHAFTSWESEN
(1957).
96. SOELTER, DAs RABATTKARTELL iI GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBBESCHRANK-
UNGEN "DER BETRIEB" 887, 913 (1956).
97. A practice called, in the vernacular, "beziehungskartell."
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been used to strengthen the discipline among cartel members as well
as to furnish protection against outsiders. All types of cartels, lawful
under sections 2 to 14, may be strengthened by a combination of
patent licenses and cartel obligations. In section 20 IV it is expressly
stated that sections 1 to 14 "remain unaffected" by the special patent
rules of sections 20 and 21 of the cartel statute.98 On the other hand,
patent license agreements may not exceed the exceptions from the
cartel prohibition under sections 2 to 14, unless expressly authorized
by section 20 II. While the formulation of this section seems to apply
more to vertical restraints (not discussed here in detail) than to
horizontal agreements, its practical importance for cartels is bound
to be felt. A purely hypothetical example, constructed on the basis
of the well-known former General Electric and Westinghouse license
agreements may help. Fixing of prices by the licensee for "the pro-
tected product," or by the licensee and cross-licensee for the product
resulting from the use of the pertinent patent is valid.99 By this method
the entire horizontal line of producers may be bound to obey fixed
prices. This line may be strengthened by limitation in the sale to
wholesalers or retailers to the extent that they have to obey the prices
fixed. Very much depends on the definition of "protected article" in
section 20 II (2). Does it require the existence of a product patent?
Or does the use of a process-patent justify such action?
Patent licenses, even if granted to horizontal competitors, may con-
tain restraints as to quantity and method of production or sale as well
as limit production or sale to certain territories. 0 0 Pfanner even be-
lieves that in the interest of maintaining the reputation of the quality
of products manufactured under the particular patent the patent
owner may require the licensee to buy all raw materials exclusively
from the patent owner or a firm connected with him.'0 '
The patentee and his licensee-in the cartel cases one has to deal
often with cross-license situations-may bind each other to establish
exclusive exchange of information and the obligation to grant each
other licenses in regard to "improvement patents and patents by virtue
of which the field of application of the patent may be enlarged."'102
All these obligations have to be mutual. This mutuality is important
where the firms operating on the same level are of equal importance.
However, smaller firms will find that an obligation to hand over the
98. Section 20 is applicable to patents and design patents. Trademarks and
convrights are not affected.
99. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 20 II (2)
(1957).
100. Id. § 20 I.
101. Id. § 20 IT (1). For a different opinion of this matter, see LANGEN, DAS
KARTELLGESETZ 104, 129 (1950).
102. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 20 II (3)
(1957) (Anwendungspatent).
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results of their progress to the big competitor may be of great nuisance
value. Furthermore licensees may be bound not to attack the licensed
patent.
103
If these rules were to have unlimited application many industries
or even entire trades could be "cartelized" for long periods merely
with the help of a few more or less important patents. However, these
rules have been included as an exception to the general statement of
section 20 I:
Agreements regulating acquisition or licensing of patents, design-patents
... are ineffective, as far as they impose limitations in business behavior
on the acquiring person or the licensee which exceed the scope of the
industrial property right.
Langen suggests that the restraints permissible under section 20 do
not cover cases of substantial cross licensing. Maybe a similar inter-
pretation will develop as in the United States, in the cases following
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.1°4 preventing the "organiza-
tion of an industry" by patent structures. Section 20 III authorizes,
however, the Cartel Office to license agreements which exceed the
broad statutory permissions, "provided the economic freedom of action
of the person acquiring the patent or the license is not unreasonably re-
strained and the competition not substantially restrained as a result
of these special limitations." Even without such a license of the Cartel
Office, the most restraining license provisions may be included in
license agreements concerning the export of patented goods. Special
reference is made here to the discussion on the extraterritorial effect
and the rules on the European market which appears above.
Section 21 of the German statute has an especially important inno-
vation: agreements on patent licenses are equalized with agreements
on "industrial secrets," whether patentable or not. Since "industrial
secrets" are not subject to any statutory period, the agreements as
to them are unlimited. A number of questions are presented. Who
determines what is "secret" enough to justify restraint of this type?
What should be the duration and extent of "secret"? And how secret
can it remain after publication to a large number of licensees? Is this
step not a serious danger to the patent system since one may achieve
better and more lasting protection without a patent than with a
patent? Consideration of the international implications alone may
prevent a movement to do business without patents.
103. Id. § 20 11 (4).
104. 340 U.S. 76 (1950).
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Cartel Discipline and Organization
Past experience shows that the broad field in which cartels function
in a lawful way requires rules on the internal organization and be-
havior of cartels as well as on their activities affecting outsiders or
customers. Cartels shall not, by threat or otherwise, induce members
to agree to measures not permissible under the act.105 The practice
seems to be developing that the prohibition of discrimination is ex-
pressly formulated in conditions made a part of licenses granted by the
Cartel Office. 06
Cartel discipline may revive the previous system of organizational
fines imposed on members by organizations, committees or tribunals.
The Bundesgericht has limited judicial review over this practice to
the question whether the bylaws authorized such fines and the prin-
cipal rules of procedure have been obeyed. 0
7
The statute prohibits the sale of securities given by the members
of a cartel as a guarantee for loyal performance of the contract, un-
less such sale is permitted by the Cartel Office.108 In these instances
the Office must protect the members against discrimination or un-
reasonable treatment. Only in very special cases may a "defendant"
before a cartel tribunal, confronted with a threatened fine, ask for
the protection of section 91, which authorizes parties called before
an arbitration tribunal to request a decision by the ordinary courts,
since section 91 is only applicable to "legal litigation resulting from
agreements or resolutions" covered by the cartel statute. In most
cases, however, disciplinary action for violation of cartel rules is not
"legal litigation" within the meaning of section 91.
In many ways, directly or indirectly, cartel organizations try to
impose their organizational power on outside competition as well as
on customers. Under the rule of section 25 II "associations of enter-
prises" shall not "compel" horizontal competitors to join in a cartel
or to behave in the market in conformance with cartel policy. 00 They
shall not boycott customers or unjustifically discriminate among
them.110
The statutory provisions on vertical restraints,"' not discussed in
this paper, may prove to have their principal importance when ex-
ercised by enterprises belonging to cartels or by enterprises operating
in conformity with them. Section 15 is a general condemmnation of
105. "CARTEL 9TATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY § 25 I (1957).
106. Id. H§ 25 II. 25 MI.
107. BGH X/4/1956, reported in WuW/E-BGH p. 159; see also MEYER-
CoRDm. DIE VEREMSSTRAFE (1956).
108. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 14 (1957).
109. Id. §. 25 11 (1), 25 H (3).
110. Id. § 25 1, 26 I, 26 II.
111. Id. § 15.
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"contracts between enterprises with regard to goods or commercial
services dealing with markets subject to the cartel statute which
restrain a party to the agreement in his freedom to set prices or con-
ditions of business in agreements which he enters into with third
persons concerning merchandise delivered to him or other merchan-
dise or commercial services." It is apparent that the restraint as to
the use of merchandise which is subject to a cartel rule is much more
effective than restraints in regard to other products, since the cus-
tomer has no alternative other than to accept the restraint, whether
in contractual relation with one or the other cartel members. Vertical
restraints become unavoidable if a product is cartelized under one or
the other "exceptions" under sections 2 to 14, on the producer as
well as on the wholesaler level. The special case of exclusive dealing
clauses, a typical vertical restraint, dealt with in section 18, declares
such clauses lawful until prohibited by decree of the Cartel Office.
This decree may be issued if such clause unreasonably restrains the
economic freedom of action of a party to the contract or of other enter-
prises and if by the scope of such "restraints" the competition on the
Market for these or other goods or commerical services has been sub-
stantially affected."'11
The observer of cartels knows how often these exclusive dealing
clauses have been instruments of cartel organizations. The use of
"loyalty discounts" if merchandise has been purchased only from
member firms during a certain period of time has been a traditional
device of a combination of cartel and exclusive dealing. Whether one
may justify those discounts under section 3, requiring "consideration
for discount" is more than doubtful, but other combining devices may
be used.
Biedenkopf, in his thesis on the exclusive dealing clauses 113 exempli-
fies through these clauses the "rule-setting" character, i.e., private
rule making as against statute or administrative, of cartel agreements.
He would find even more justification for his important thesis if he
would consider an eventual "Konditionenkartell," covering all eco-
nomic levels of the market, combined with a similar system of dis-
count cartels, combined furthermore with a uniform use of the
exclusive dealing clause whether or not included in the uniform con-
ditions of business. As a matter of fact a potential buyer of the perti-
nent product could not buy under other conditions any more than
he can buy under another Civil Code. Therefore, such rules should
be interpreted by the courts not as contracts but as norms. That means
112. Id. § 18 .




that, not the private interest, but the public interest would decide in
the last result.
The Cartel Office may intervene in case of the use of another verti-
cal restraint, partially declared lawful, i.e., the "fair trade" rules, if
adopted in "combination with other restraints of competition and
resulting in an increase of the prices of the merchandise affected, not
justified by the general economic conditions or to prevent a decrease
of the prices or to limit their production or turnover.""n 4 The inde-
pendence of the discount cartels and the "fair trade" question should
become a substantial problem for the Cartel Office and the courts.
Procedure
The statute establishes the Cartel Office in Berlin within the juris-
diction of the Minister of Economics." 5 The committee report on the
statute points out:
Since the Federal Cartel Office is no Federal Court, but an administrative
bureau, both committees (judicial and economic) believed that the right
of the Minister to give instructions should not be limited, since only by
this method will the Minister be able to bear the political responsibility
for the decisions of the Cartel Office.
The only special rule as to those instructions is the rule that general
instructions, for example, on general principles of interpretation of the
statute, are to be published in the Federal Register (Bundesan-
zeiger) .116 The very broad use of such concepts as "general welfare,"
"prevailing interest of competition over regulation," etc., may invite
the issuance of many general instructions under section 49.
The Cartel Office, under such instructions and under the organiza-
tional command of the President of the Office" 7 is being organized on
a quasi-judicial level. The principal decrees will be issued by "decree
divisions" consisting of a chairman and two associates. Objections
against these decrees may be filed before "objection divisions" again
composed of a chairman and two associates." 8 For the preparation of
decrees or decisions of any kind the office may collect all necessary
evidence.n9 It has subpoena power126 However, in case of lack of co-
operation this office is required to call on the court having local juris-
diction for the issue of a warrant.' 2 ' The Cartel Office may call experts
114. "CARTEL STATUTE" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 17 I (3)
(1957).
115. Id. § 48 1.
116. Id. § 49.
117. Id. § 48 11.
118. Id. §§ 48 II, 48 III, 59.
119. Id. § 54 1.
120. Id. § 55 I.
121. Id. § 55 II.
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and witnesses; however, if an oath is requested by the Office, the local
court shall decide whether the request of the Office is justified. By
this procedure the "decree division" of the Cartel Office reaches a
decision which is either accepted or made the subject of future liti-
gation.m
Of special importance is the power of the Office to issue "temporary
decrees in order to establish a temporary regulation." 23 This power
exists in regard to applications for licenses, 2 4 motions for revocation
or amendment of a license and many other instances. After exhaustion
of the administrative remedies, the party considering itself unjustly
burdened by a decree may ask for judicial review by a special division
of the Court of Appeals in Berlin (Kartellsenat).125 From the decision
of this Court the objecting party or the Cartel Office may call on the
Federal Supreme Court, provided the Court of Appeals, or on petition
of review the Federal Supreme Court itself, permits such petition for
judicial review by the "Kartellsenat of the Highest Court."'2 6 While
the review of the Appeals Court includes the factual and legal aspect
of the case (Beschwerde),127 the review of the highest court goes only
to the law ("Rechtsbeschwerde").' The review courts may affirm,
overrule or partly overrule the decree, but they cannot substitute
another decree129
During the period of petition for judicial review the enforcement
of the decree is suspended,13o but the Cartel Office may maintain its
temporary ruling issued under section 56.131 Judicial review may also
be asked for by persons burdened by the refusal of the Minister of
Economics to grant licenses for the establishment of an emergency
cartel. This particular provision exemplifies most clearly the prob-
lem with which the courts are going to be confronted in these review
proceedings. We have seen that the Minister of Economics may issue
special or emergency instructions in all cases. We have futhermore
seen how often the Cartel Office is called on to determine whether
"public welfare or national economy" require certain actions or when
the national interest of one economic institution prevails over another
institution. The language of section 70 IV deprives the reviewing
courts of the excuse that determinations of all these points is up to
the executive side of government:
122. Id. §§ 57, 59.
123. Id. § 56.
124. Id. §§ 4, 5 11, 6 IT, 7, 20 III, 21.
125. Id. §§ 2, 62 IV.
126. Id. §§ 73-75.
127. Id. § 69 I.
128. Id. § 75 IV.
129. Id. § 70 II.




The decree is also without legal or factual basis, if the Cartel Office made
a mistaken use of its discretion, especially if it exceeded the legally
established borderlines of discretion or violated, by its use of discretion,
the meaning and purpose of the statute. The evaluation, however, of
the condition or future development of the national economy shall not be
reviewable by the courts.
It will be a very hard question to decide which of the many different
determinations of economic policy made by the Cartel Office in ad-
ministering the law, such as those called for under sections 2 to 7, deal
with this type of evaluation and which do not. At this point the Ger-
man practice will find not only a most difficult problem of interpreta-
tion, but a constitutional question: the conflict between the political
side of the Government, the Minister of Economics and the courts.
It is argued that this procedure violates the separation of powers
provided for by the basic law.
For the future development of the law it is most important to know
who is to be considered a party at interest and thus entitled to be a
petitioner for judicial review. The act states that those persons who
could ifie objections against the issuance of a decree or the refusal
of a decree in the first instance are parties at interest,132 namely:
(1) The person who submitted an application to the office;
(2) cartels, enterprises or commercial or professional organizations,
against which the proceedings are directed;
(3) persons or associations of persons, whose interests are being
substantially affected by the decree and who, on their own motion,
have been called by the Cartel Office into the proceeding.133 The ad-
mission of a person, by the Office, into the case, before the end of the
"first instance" proceedings determines whether later judicial review
may be granted. The problem has already been presented whether the
decision of the Office as to admission into the case is a "decree" from
which judicial review may be taken. In addition to this list of persons
permitted to ask for judicial review, section 62 III permits the filing
of petition for judicial review for the "omission of the Cartel Office
to issue a certain decree applied for, whose issuance, according to the
allegation of petitioner, can be asked for as a right of such petitioner."
Unless satisfactory reason is shown, an omission of this kind exists
whenever the Cartel Office did not-within a reasonable period of
time-make a decision on the petition for issuance of such decree. In
discussing the various types of cartel licenses we distinguished be-
tween statutory rules where the Cartel Office "has to grant a license"
132. Id. § 62.
133. Id. §§ 51 1, 51 HI.
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(export cartel with domestic effects)1 and other rules which leave
the determination as to granting a license to the discretion of the
Cartel Office. Only in the first line of cases does a person whose peti-
tion for a license was rejected have a right under section 62 III. In
other cases persons opposing the licensing of cartels or persons who
try to induce the Cartel Office to intervene in exclusive dealing clauses
under section 18 have no right to appeal, unless admitted into the
proceedings by the Cartel Office.
The cartel problem remains a judicial problem, apart from the field
of judicial review. Cases between private litigants may directly affect
the cartel statute since no court may help in the enforcement of any
restrictive horizontal agreement not declared "effective" directly by
the statute, or made "effective" on statutory authorization by the Car-
tel Office. No one can allege the legality of a cartel before a court
of law, about which the Cartel Office is not informed or which the
Cartel Office has not licensed. The automatic effectiveness of cartels
requires, as we have seen, the filing of a report to the Cartel Office.
Therefore no one can rely on "unreported cartels" before any court.
The cartel register, to be established under section 9 I has only evi-
dentiary importance. While all reported or licensed cartels (with the
exception of export cartels) should be registered, the act of registra-
tion has no constitutive effect.135 Each court, before which litigation
dealing with cartel agreements or the cartel statute is in question, has
to inform the Cartel Office and permit this office to appear as amicus
curiae.13
The statute establishes a cause of action for any person, protected
by any provision of the cartel statute or any decree issued under it,
against an intentional or negligent violation of such provision or de-
cree. A complaint may be brought for damages resulting from such
violation.137 Under general principles of the law of torts a plaintiff
may ask for a court injunction restraining a defendant from further
violations. The limitation of this cause of action to cases in which the
defendant has violated a provision or decree issued in the interest
of the plaintiff's protection is going to raise most difficult problems of
interpretation. It is certain that the general prohibition of section 1
is not a provision having the purpose of protecting persons outside
the cartel. On the other hand it is certain that the rules prohibiting
certain acts of discrimination or boycott 38 are provisions protecting
134. Id. § 6 II.
135. Id. § 9 II.
136. Id. § 90 II.
137. Id. § 35.
138. Id. §§ 25, 26.
1958]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
definite persons. It is uncertain whether the rule on exclusive dealing
clauses 3 9 falls in the same category.
Conclusion
The cartel problem is a political, economic and legal problem. The
draftsmen of the statute, on the one hand, were apparently impressed
by the legal character of the American solution, enforced by courts
and an independent executive agency (FTC) subject to judicial re-
view. On the other hand, neither parliament nor the cabinet nor the
Minister for Economics intended to withdraw from their respective
fields. Any questions of cartel control, whether absolute prohibition or
selective licensing, involves serious political considerations. While in
the United States both political parties support, basically, a policy of
free enterprise, in Germany the present opposition party gives at least
lip service to some system of a planned economy. Even in the party
in power, which is generally in favor of a liberal economic policy,
strong elements believe in a cartelized form of "free enterprise."
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the statute tried to
reach a compromise between a political, a quasi-judicial and a judicial
system.
The German courts, following a long tradition in tort law, will be
very reluctant to admit lawsuits in cases in which the executive side
of the government has the responsibility and remedies available to
give aid. The courts will also find it difficult-as the American courts
did-to determine "damages" resulting from violations of provisions
of the statute and decrees issued by the Cartel Office.
A most difficult task awaits the Court of Appeals in Berlin in de-
ciding motions of the Cartel Office asking imposition of an administra-
tive fine on persons who have committed a "violation of order" and
in whose prosecution a "public interest" appears to exist.140 The Office
may file a motion at its discretion. The legislative committees insisted
most emphatically that this proceeding is not of a criminal nature
and the fine not a criminal penalty. The legislature did not intend to
attack the civil reputation of the offenders but to induce them to com-
ply. Therefore the threatened fines for intentional violation are very
high, up to 100,000DM (approximately $25,000) or treble the amount
of profits made as a result of violation of the act.
141
The statute of 1957 does not bring to an end the German dispute
over cartels. For the time being the place of the discussion will be
transferred from the parliamentary place to the Cartel Office and
139. Id. § 18.
140. Id. § 81.
141. Id. § 38.
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the courts. Perhaps because of contemplated integration into the Euro-
pean market-generally highly cartelized-with a consideration of the
importance of East-West trade and the end of the post-war boom the
law had to be written in a flexible way. The road is left open for liberal
tendencies to lead Germany and Europe finally to a relatively free
form of trade. The first president of the Cartel Office, Dr. Giinther,
is familiar with American experiences in this field and is well equipped
for the position. In the future much will depend upon American prac-
tices and developments in this field. Likewise, American developments
will certainly be influenced by the next phases in Europe. The Insti-
tutes for International Trade Law at Frankfurt University and George-
town University will attempt to keep Americans aware of the Euro-
pean trend and the Europeans cognizant of the American trend. Prob-
lems peculiar to the economy of each, taking into consideration
pertinent historical, social and political questions, require that con-
tinuous attempts at re-assessment and interpretation be made.

